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RESPONSE 
 
 
E-SPORTS AS A PRISM FOR THE ROLE OF EVOLVING 
TECHNOLOGY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY* 
JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN† 
In response to Dan L. Burk, Owning e-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Profes-
sional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535 (2013). 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Symposium on the Evolving Internet, I have been asked to provide 
some reflections on Dan Burk’s thoughtful Article analyzing proprietary 
rights in e-sports.1 E-sports, or professional video gaming, is already big 
business in South Korea and is becoming increasingly popular in the United 
States. Professional gaming competitions and their distribution present 
myriad intellectual property (IP) questions, particularly about the “owner-
ship and control of rights in player performances,”2 given that the competi-
tions are publicly performed and often broadcast and streamed online. 
Professor Burk suggests ways current IP law might analyze some of the 
 
© Jennifer E. Rothman, 2013. 
† Professor of Law and Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount Univer-
sity, Los Angeles, California. I thank Christopher Yoo and the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review for organizing this conference and for asking me to contribute this commentary. This essay 
is adapted from a talk given at the University of Pennsylvania on October 20, 2012, as part of the 
Law Review’s Symposium, The Evolving Internet. 
1 Dan L. Burk, Owning e-Sports: Proprietary Rights in Professional Computer Gaming, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1535 (2013). 
2 Id. at 1536. 
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complex questions raised by e-sports.3 In this Response, I focus on what e-
sports reveals about how IP law should engage with new industries, tech-
nologies, and media of expression.  
New industries and new technologies often influence the development 
of IP law. Copyright law, in particular, has always evolved in the face of new 
technology, such as the printing press and player piano rolls; however, until 
recently, copyright’s evolution has been slow and the changes to the law 
ostensibly technologically neutral. Over the last twenty years, however, 
Congress has shifted gears and repeatedly passed technology-specific 
legislation to address new inventions and industries.4 As a result, copyright 
law has become unwieldy, overly complex, and incoherent to lay people and 
experts alike.5 Worse still, the law has become ossified in the face of rapidly 
changing technology that calls for nimbleness and flexibility.  
New York Times technology columnist David Pogue has likened keeping 
up with the pace of new technological developments to “drinking out of a 
fire hose.”6 Computers and phones become obsolete almost as soon as they 
are purchased, and the next big thing could transform markets and indus-
tries overnight (as iTunes and the iPhone have). The rapidity of such 
changes, especially in the context of computer technology and Internet 
applications, presents many challenges for the law, and for potential legisla-
tion in particular. In the context of e-sports and video games, there have 
already been calls to pass legislation addressing some of the ownership 
conflicts that have arisen or that are anticipated.7 
In this Response to Owning e-Sports, I consider the ways in which IP law 
can address the IP questions raised by changing technology and emerging 
industries. IP laws cannot shift with every new invention or business. If 
Congress relies on industry-specific legislation, trying to intervene in each 
emerging or anticipated problem wrought by new technology, then our IP 
system will fail us. Instead, the common law and broader principles of IP law 
are tools better designed to address these novel IP questions.  
 
3 See id. at 1544-77 (analyzing e-sports through the lens of copyright and alternative legal 
regimes, such as the right of publicity and “neighboring rights”). 
4 See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. 
5 See David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1331 (2004) 
(describing the current state of copyright law as a “hopeless mishmash”). 
6 David Pogue, Tech. Columnist, N.Y. TIMES, Keynote Address at the University of Pennsyl-
vania Law Review Symposium: The Evolving Internet, at 47:21 (Oct. 20, 2012), available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/newsroom/its_player.cfm?path=/pennlaw/temp/Evolving/Law_Revi
ew_Evolving_Keynote.mov.  
7 See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Who Owns an Avatar? Copyright, Creativity, and Virtual Worlds, 14 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 959, 991 (2012) (advocating new amendments to the Copyright Act to 
address ownership issues for video game players and providers). 
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E-sports presents a useful case study of alternative ways of thinking about 
technological changes and challenges to the IP system. My analysis focuses on 
two primary insights. First, by revealing the inadequacy of the initial 
analytical or doctrinal move made by courts, new industries and technologies 
can illuminate missteps taken in IP common law. I consider two examples in 
the context of e-sports: the use of “persona” in right of publicity law, and the 
“initial interest confusion” doctrine in trademark law.  
Second, a new context can highlight open and unanswered questions in 
IP law that need to be addressed, sometimes by legislation, but more often 
by applying existing law and focusing on the basic principles that underlie 
the relevant area of law. I consider the example of how copyright law 
addresses increasingly public uses of copyrighted content. 
I. PEERING OVER THE PRECIPICE 
New contexts sometimes reveal the need to recalibrate or overthrow a 
flawed doctrine. I focus on two examples of this effect, both of which are 
raised in the context of e-sports: first, the use of persona in right of publicity 
law; and second, the initial interest confusion doctrine in trademark law. 
Both doctrines have expanded in recent years, and I have criticized them 
both elsewhere, at some length.8 Considering both examples in the context 
of e-sports provides further proof of the bankruptcy of these doctrines and 
the ways in which new technology pushes them to their logical extreme, 
thereby revealing their fundamental flaws. 
A. Persona and the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity provides a cause of action when a person or entity 
uses another’s identity without permission.9 Although Professor Burk 
suggests that the right of publicity usually requires a physical manifestation 
of the person,10 in recent years, the right of publicity has swept more 
 
8 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trade-
mark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 122 (2005) [hereinafter Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion] 
(“The bulk of my criticism of initial interest confusion is directed at the use of the term when 
there is no finding of likely confusion, but instead only a finding of initial interest.”); Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 206 (2002) 
[hereinafter Rothman, Copyright Preemption] (“The application of persona to right of publicity 
actions allows publicity holders to take property rights in an idea—in contravention of the 
principles behind copyright law [and] severely constrain[ing] the creative ability of authors, the 
public, and copyright holders who wish to create both original and derivative works.”). 
9 Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 202. 
10 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1569-70 (“[A]pplicability of [publicity] rights is often clearest 
when the personal trait at issue relies on material, usually bodily, portrayal.”). 
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broadly. Initially, liability was limited to uses of a person’s name, likeness, or 
image; however, the scope of the right has expanded (at least in common 
law jurisdictions) to include the concept of “persona.”11 Persona encom-
passes anything that evokes the person of an “identity-holder” (the person 
upon whom the right of publicity is based).12 The breadth of the concept 
leads to liability even when an identity-holder’s identity has not, in fact, 
been used; instead, a defendant can be held accountable for causing a mere 
mental association with the identity-holder.13 Such an expansion of the 
scope of the right of publicity raises serious First Amendment concerns, 
often conflicts with copyright holders’ rights, and expands the right beyond 
the heartland personality and economic interests that justify protecting the 
right of publicity in the first place.14 
The case most prominently associated with the concept of persona is 
White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., decided in 1992 by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.15 White involved a Samsung advertisement for its 
videocassette recorders (VCRs) that promoted the products’ longevity.16 To 
bring this point home, the commercial featured a robot wearing a dress and 
a blond wig, turning letters on the Wheel of Fortune set (or at least a recog-
nizable replica of the show’s set).17 On-screen with the robot was a caption 
reading, “Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.”18 Neither White’s name, 
nor likeness, nor voice was used in the commercial; therefore, no viewer was 
likely to think that she had appeared in the commercial. Nevertheless, the 
Ninth Circuit held that because the Samsung robot evoked White’s identity, 
her right of publicity claim was sufficient to overcome Samsung’s summary 
judgment motion and proceed to trial.19  
 
11 Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 204-05. 
12 Id. at 205. I have coined the term “identity-holder” to distinguish the person upon whom the 
right of publicity is based from the “publicity-holder,” who is the person who owns the right. If the 
right of publicity is transferable, these two people need not be the same. See Jennifer E. Rothman, The 
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 187, 234-37 (2012) (providing an in-depth discussion of 
this terminology and contending that the right of publicity should not be transferable inter vivos). 
13 Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 205. 
14 Id. at 205-06, 222-25, 252-53, 257-58. 
15 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
16 Id. at 1396. 
17 Id. Wheel of Fortune is the television game show in which Vanna White turns letters on a 
game board to help contestants solve word puzzles. 
18 Id. The year 2012 has now come and gone, but when the commercial was made it seemed 
far off, in a future filled with spaceships and robots. 
19 Id. at 1397-99. 
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Judge Alarcon dissented in  part from the decision.20 Regarding the right of 
publicity, he concluded that it was “patently clear to anyone viewing the 
commercial advertisement that Vanna White was not being depicted. No 
reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with Vanna White.”21 Alarcon 
criticized the majority for allowing White’s right of publicity claim to go to 
a jury solely on the basis that viewers would make an association between 
the Samsung robot and White (and, in particular, the role that she plays on 
Wheel of Fortune).22 Judge Kozinski similarly criticized the decision in his 
dissent from the denial of Samsung’s petition to rehear the case en banc.23 
He objected to the possibility of liability for merely “evok[ing] the celebrity’s 
image in the public’s mind.”24 Kozinski warned that this “Orwellian” notion 
of persona would give “every famous person . . . an exclusive right to 
anything that reminds the viewer of her.”25  
Judge Kozinski’s fears have proven well founded as subsequent cases 
have built upon White’s expansive interpretation of publicity rights.26 In 
Wendt v. Host International, Inc., for example, the Ninth Circuit permitted a 
right of publicity case to go forward against the operators of airport bars 
designed to remind customers of the set from the hit television series 
Cheers.27 Each bar featured two animatronic robots that were dressed 
similarly to the characters of Norm and Cliff from the series.28 George 
Wendt and John Ratzenberger, the actors who portrayed those characters on 
the show, sued, claiming that their likenesses and identities had been used 
without their permission.29 The District Court for the Central District of 
California concluded that the robots did not look like the actors and that no 
 
20 White sued Samsung under three theories: the right to privacy, the right of publicity, and 
the Lanham Act. Id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Alarcon 
concurred in the majority’s denial of White’s right to privacy claim, but dissented from the 
majority’s holding that White’s right to publicity and Lanham Act claims could go to the jury. Id. 
21 Id. at 1404. 
22 Id. at 1405. 
23 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1514-15. 
26 See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the “com-
mon-law right of publicity protects more than the knowing use of a plaintiff ’s name or likeness . . . 
. It also protects against appropriations of the plaintiff ’s identity by other means” (citing White, 
971 F.2d at 1398)).  
27 Id. at 808-09. 
28 Responding Brief of Defendant and Appellee Host International, Inc. at 1, Wendt, 125 F.3d 
806 (No. 96-55243). The defendant, Host International, had licensed the use of the characters and 
the Cheers set and name from Paramount Pictures, the producer and copyright holder of the show 
and its characters. Id. 
29 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809. 
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reasonable jury could find otherwise.30 The Ninth Circuit reversed this grant 
of summary judgment and decided, without elaboration, that the case should 
proceed to trial because there were “material facts . . . that might cause a 
reasonable jury to find [the robots] sufficiently ‘like’ the appellants.”31  
Judge Kozinski dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc in Wendt, 
bemoaning “[r]obots again.”32 He described the panel’s conclusion as a “curt 
assertion,” offered with “little explanation,” and one that was unjustified in 
light of the usual deference to district courts on findings of fact.33 More 
importantly in the context of this discussion, Kozinski concluded that the 
panel’s analysis could only make sense under a broad understanding of likeness 
and identity.34 He interpreted the panel’s decision as allowing liability for the 
mere evocation of the actors in the minds of the bar’s customers: “[T]he panel 
allows the plaintiffs to pick up where Vanna left off: . . . anyone who wants to 
use a figure, statue, robot, drawing or poster that reminds the public of Wendt 
and Ratzenberger must first obtain (and pay for) their consent.”35 
Reading White and Wendt together demonstrates that a right of publicity 
claim may arise not only when the names, signatures, voices, and likenesses 
of plaintiffs are used, but also when the use of a character simply brings to 
mind an actor who played such a character. Such an effect is likely to occur 
frequently with respect to characters from television shows or movies.36 
Much as White was able to recover more than $400,000 from a jury for a 
“robot [that] looked nothing like her,”37 Wendt left open the door for Wendt 
and Ratzenberger to recover even if the robots were found not to look like 
them. Unsurprisingly, rather than take their chances with a jury, Host and 
Paramount settled out of court with the two actors.38 
 
30 Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., No. 93-0142-R, 1996 WL 34448499, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 
1996), rev’d, 125 F.3d 806; see also Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809-10 (noting that the district court could not 
find “any similarity at all” between the robots and the actors). 
31 Wendt, 125 F.3d at 810.  
32 Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
33 Id. 
34 See id. at 1285-87 (attributing the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the “unbounded right of pub-
licity announced in White”). 
35 Id. at 1286 (emphasis added). 
36 See id. at 1286-87 (arguing, as an illustration of the implications of Wendt, that the copy-
right holders of the television series Seinfeld could be prevented from recasting the character of 
Newman in a spin-off series); see also Wendt, 125 F.3d at 811 (citing with approval Motschenbacher 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974), in which the court held that the 
use of an image of a race car similar to one driven by the plaintiff could give rise to a right of 
publicity claim even though neither the plaintiff ’s name, nor likeness, nor image were used); 
Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 8, at 210-14, 222-25, 252-54, 257-62. 
37 Wendt, 197 F.3d at 1287. 
38 Norm and Cliff Cheered by Lawsuit, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2001, at C2. 
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In the context of e-sports, the doctrine of persona is taken to its logical ex-
treme in a way that demonstrates the concept’s hollowness. With new technolo-
gies, what constitutes a “persona” is virtually limitless. In her study of e-sports, 
sociologist T.L. Taylor suggests that e-sports players have specific, recognizable 
styles of play.39 Burk raises the possibility that the right of publicity—or a 
similar right—might protect these distinctive styles and prevent others from 
adopting similar styles.40 This prospect is not far-fetched, given that persona 
has been used to protect a singer’s vocal style, even though neither his voice nor 
his music were used in an advertisement for tortilla chips.41 
Protecting a unique playing style under right of publicity law would se-
verely constrain other players who might wish to adopt a similar style (per-
haps because they want to pay homage to a successful pro or because the style 
itself might make them more likely to succeed at the game) or who organical-
ly have a similar style of play. Such an extension of the right of publicity 
highlights the thin ice on which the doctrine of persona sits. The mere 
evocation of style or the spurring of mental associations should not establish a 
use deserving of liability.  
Similar to e-sports’ illumination of the pitfalls of using persona to estab-
lish a violation of the right of publicity, new technologies—especially the 
Internet—have also exacerbated, extended, and highlighted the flawed 
trademark law doctrine of initial interest confusion. 
B. Initial Interest Confusion and the Overextension of Trademark Law 
The touchstone of trademark infringement is a showing that consumers 
are likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation when a 
defendant uses another’s mark (or something similar) on its own products 
or services, or in its advertising.42 Over time, however, some courts have 
created a doctrine called “initial interest confusion,” in which they have 
found trademark infringement—even in the absence of likely consumer 
confusion—on the basis that a consumer might be initially “interested,” 
“attracted,” or “distracted” by a defendant’s products or services because of 
 
39 T.L. TAYLOR, RAISING THE STAKES: E-SPORTS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF 
COMPUTER GAMING 109-10 (2012). 
40 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1572 (suggesting, albeit somewhat skeptically, that there may be 
elements of an e-sports professional’s game performance that are “sufficiently distinctive” to 
warrant individualized proprietary consideration). 
41 See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096-�� (�th Cir. ����) (affirming a verdict 
against Frito-Lay for its radio commercial, which featured a vocal performance “imitating [singer 
Tom] Waits’ raspy singing voice”). 
42 Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion, supra note 8, at 107. 
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an association with a plaintiff ’s mark, products, or services.43 This ill-
conceived doctrine spread like wildfire in the early days of the Internet as 
jurists unfamiliar with the new technology thought that confusion was likely 
to run rampant on the Internet.44 Courts described clicking on another’s 
website out of curiosity or actual interest as akin to being hijacked; their 
concern was that consumers would somehow find themselves unable to 
navigate back to a trademark holder’s official site.45 
As the Internet has grown, some courts have backed away from this mis-
guided attempt to extend liability. Now that judges and consumers have 
become more familiar with the Internet, and the Internet’s speed and 
reliability have vastly improved, the notion that the new technology of the 
Internet justifies extending liability to mere association has been soundly 
refuted.46 The mere diversion of consumers by offering alternative choices 
or referring to trademarked products is not an appropriate subject for 
regulation when the consumers know where they are going and what they 
are buying. Although a trademark holder might lose some business to 
competitors in these instances, it is appropriate to permit such fair and free 
competition. The presentation of options and alternatives promotes con-
sumer choice and low-cost, high-quality goods and services. Competitors 
should be able to divert, attract, or interest consumers as long as they do not 
mislead them as to sponsorship, source, or affiliation. 
In the context of e-sports, Burk notes that video game companies have 
tried to control uses of and associations with their games under a variety of 
theories—most notably, copyright law.47 Many e-sports competitors and 
competitions would no doubt appreciate funding and sponsorship from the 
relevant video game companies, but the absence of such sponsorship should 
 
43 Id. at 108 (emphasis omitted). This doctrine originally emerged from an appropriate starting 
point: after Congress amended the Lanham Act in 1962, thereby eliminating the requirement that 
“purchasers” be deceived, courts expanded trademark infringement doctrine to take into considera-
tion the likelihood of confusion prior to the time of sale. Id. at 160-61. In adopting the initial 
interest confusion doctrine, however, some courts have ignored the Lanham Act’s requirement that 
there be a likelihood of confusion by holding that the mere diversion of business away from a 
trademark holder constitutes trademark infringement. Id. at 122 & n.57. 
44 See id. at 109-10, 117-21, 168-76. 
45 See id. at 117-21, 168-76 (highlighting the shortcomings of various decisions, including 
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., ��� F.�d ���� (�th Cir. ����), that radically 
“overestimate[d] the difficulty in returning to the Internet Highway”).  
46 Cf. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing 
that the sophistication of Internet users weighs against likely confusion when a defendant 
incorporates another’s trademark into its URL). 
47 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1544-69; see also TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 167-69 (describing 
video game developer Blizzard’s far-reaching claim that its right to manage its video games 
extends far beyond broadcast licensing). 
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not result in legal liability. Lawful purchasers of the games should be able to 
advertise the nature of the competition at hand without risking liability for 
mere association with, or initial diversion from, a video game company’s 
product, absent a false or misleading suggestion of endorsement. The ability 
to use trademarked products in public should be sacrosanct—not only 
because mere association should not be actionable, but also because such 
uses should be protected under either statutory or nominative fair use 
defenses. Statutory fair use (sometimes also referred to as “descriptive fair 
use”) provides a defense when a defendant uses the plaintiff ’s trademark to 
accurately describe the features of its own product or service.48 Nominative 
fair use provides a defense when a defendant uses the plaintiff ’s trademark 
to describe the plaintiff ’s product, rather than its own.49 In the e-sports 
context, the competitions and players describe the game they are actually 
playing, which happens to be trademarked. This should meet the require-
ments of either statutory fair use (in jurisdictions where the concept 
embraces references to another’s trademark rather than only to underlying 
qualities) or nominative fair use, so long as nothing is done to expressly 
indicate official sponsorship.  
The examination of the troublesome concepts of persona and initial interest 
confusion suggests that new technologies, such as the Internet, may magnify 
and illuminate ill-conceived doctrines in IP by taking them to extremes, or in 
unexpected directions. As I discuss next, the Internet and e-sports have also 
revealed undeveloped aspects of IP law that are profoundly important to 
achieving a better balance between rights of copyright owners and users.  
II. ILLUMINATION: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
DIVIDE IN COPYRIGHT LAW  
The Internet has exploded our concept of what is public and what is pri-
vate. E-sports provides a good example of this phenomenon. While people 
 
48 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (noting that a party’s use of another’s trademark does not 
constitute infringement if the mark “is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe 
the goods and services of such party”); see also Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion, supra note 8, at 176-77. 
49 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). The 
nominative fair use defense applies if the following requirements are met:  
“First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable with-
out use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as 
is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must 
do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorse-
ment by the trademark holder.”  
Id. at 308; see also Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion, supra note 8, at 177-78. 
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once played board games and video games in the privacy of their own homes, 
usually either by themselves or with only a few friends, now video games are 
played over the Internet with many parties, or in public competitions amid 
fans and broadcast media. What was once private, solo, and off-the-radar is 
now very public, communal, and trackable. This shift raises important 
questions for IP law, especially copyright law. As Burk emphasizes, e-sports 
involves “user participation, interactivity, and collaboration[, all of which] are 
common to information and communication technology, [but] with which 
copyright seems particularly unequipped to deal.”50  
Copyright law has long created conflicts between the interests of copy-
right holders and those of the broader public who wish to access, consume, 
use, comment on, and build upon copyrighted works. Many of these 
potential conflicts were, until recently, swept under the rug. In a world in 
which many uses of copyrighted works were private and untraceable, some 
potentially infringing uses went largely unnoticed. Some scholars, notably 
Jessica Litman, have concluded that because of the historical lack of en-
forcement against such “personal” copying, these uses sit outside of copy-
right law.51 I have questioned the conclusion that nonenforcement carves out 
exceptions to copyright law, but more importantly, I have also contended that 
what is “personal” should not turn on whether a particular use is made in 
private or in public.52 Uses that are personal in nature may take place in 
public and their legitimacy should therefore be evaluated along other vectors.  
In the case of e-sports, many of the potential infringements of copyright 
take place in the context of individuals engaging in uses of video games that 
they have been given access to and encouraged to play—in fact, most of the 
potentially infringing acts involve playing those games in public for both 
pleasure and competition. As I have noted in my work on custom and the 
common law in the context of IP, community-building leisure activities and 
sports competitions were among the traditional bases for permitting public 
 
50 Burk, supra note 1, at 1537. 
51 See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1878-94, 1908, 1911-20 (2007) 
(arguing that a broad conceptualization of lawful personal use strikes the appropriate “equilibrium 
between copyright owners’ rights to exploit works and individuals’ liberties to enjoy them,” but 
favoring noncommercial and private uses for this personal-use privilege); see also L. RAY PATTERSON 
& STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 193-96 (1991) 
(relying on historically unenforced zones of personal use to argue that there should be no infringement 
of copyright when an individual uses a copyrighted work for his own “personal” or “private” use). 
52 Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 463, 471-74 (2010). 
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use of real property owned by others.53 Such activities were deemed to 
merit an exception to private property laws on the ground that they facili-
tated the ability of communities to come together.54 E-sports is about such 
communal uses of video games.55 Taylor’s study reveals that one of the 
central features of e-sports is a desire to connect to others.56 In the context 
of IP, such communal activities and competitions should be in the heartland 
of uses that are given extra latitude and protection. 
 I do not intend to draw individual conclusions about possible uses of 
copyrighted video games and whether they would be infringing or fair. 
Instead, my focus is on the larger point that the Internet has changed the 
way we use copyrighted works. Uses of copyrighted works are now more 
easily trackable, blockable, and removable than ever before. This new reality 
requires copyright law to confront whether fair use is an affirmative right or 
merely a defense. Technology could spell the end of fair use, not only 
because of its ability to track uses, but also because of its ability to limit 
access to and uses of copyrighted works.57 We will need to decide if, and 
how, the law should intervene to constrain this potential of the evolving 
Internet.58 We need to think deeply about the values that we wish to 
promote with fair use and what it means to give some use rights to the 
public—not just when such uses cannot be detected, but also when they are 
front and center. New legislation may be required in the long run, but first 
we should see if the guiding principles of copyright law can direct us toward 
an equitable balance between protecting copyright holders and providing 
room for continued fair use. 
 
53 Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright, Custom and Lessons from the Common Law (manuscript at 
2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2183317, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013). 
54 Id.; Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Prop-
erty, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 758-59, 766-71, 779-81 (1986). 
55 See Burk, supra note 1, at 1540-41 (describing the communal nature of e-sports). 
56 See TAYLOR, supra note 39, at 86-89 (“From the earliest days of PC gaming this desire to 
connect to others and play head-to-head or cooperatively has been present. The old work-around 
of dragging machines to each others’ houses has been significantly supplanted via online net-
worked capability. The multiplayer aspect of e-sports is central.”). 
57 Undoubtedly, some sophisticated parties will be able to circumvent many of these techno-
logical efforts, but the general public may face significant hurdles in doing so.  
58 Another significant challenge in the Internet era is created by licensing regimes that limit 
fair use and ownership of copyrighted works via contract (e.g., clickwrap licenses). See Viva R. 
Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 45, 87-108 (2007) (arguing for preemption of the enforcement of adhesion contracts 
that place limitations on copyright’s fair use doctrine); Ochoa, supra note 7, at 964-66 (discussing 
the impact of end-user license agreements on copyright ownership of avatars). 
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CONCLUSION 
E-sports provides a prime example of how new industries and new tech-
nologies can reveal new facets of IP law, as well as flaws in its current 
articulation. Many of the doctrinal challenges for IP law that Burk raises in 
his Article reveal where, and how, the law has overextended itself—for 
example, in relying on persona or initial interest confusion to find liability. 
E-sports also highlights the Internet’s shift from a private world of engage-
ment with IP to a public one. This shift requires a back-to-basics approach, 
in which new technology should be seen as facilitating the development of 
IP law rather than requiring new, industry-specific legislation. 
New technologies and industries provide both opportunities and chal-
lenges. IP law should not rush into the breach when such challenges arise. 
Instead, new technologies provide an occasion for thinking deeply about 
broader guiding principles that are not wedded to any particular technology. 
If we become overly focused on specific technologies and specific industries, 
we will find ourselves reproducing the failings of recent amendments to the 
Copyright Act, such as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).59 
When it was passed, the AHRA sought to address an emerging, but now-
defunct, digital audio technology known as “DAT” (Digital Audio Tape). 
Even if such laws are not immediately outdated, they can quickly lock in 
regimes that could—and should—have evolved differently. Consider the 
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA),60 
passed as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).61 
OCILLA sought to immunize internet service providers (ISPs) from 
copyright liability for the posting of infringing materials by third parties.62 
One of the main purposes of the legislation was to temper the Wild West 
atmosphere of the Internet by encouraging self-monitoring—behavior that, 
without the immunity provided by OCILLA, could have placed ISPs at risk 
 
59 Pub. L. No. 102-���, ��� Stat. ���� (����) (codified as amended at �� U.S.C. §§ ����–1010 
(2006)). At the time it was passed, David Nimmer called this legislation the “worst thing that had 
ever happened to the Copyright Act.” Nimmer, supra note 5, at 1331. The AHRA was applied so 
narrowly to the specific DAT technology for which it was passed that it was held not to cover 
other digital recording devices, such as MP3 players, which turned out to be a much more 
successful technology. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 
F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Rio, an MP3 player, is not a digital audio 
recording device subject to the restrictions of the AHRA). 
60 Pub. L. No. 105-���, ��� Stat. ���� (����) (codified at �� U.S.C. § ��� (����)). 
61 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
62 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (exempting service providers from liability for copyright infringement for, 
inter alia, transmission of material or system caching, if the material is submitted by a third party; 
and storing information or referring or linking users to infringing material, if the service provider 
is not on notice of the infringing material). 
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of liability under the common law for the postings of third parties.63 The law 
was enacted in an era when it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
monitor sites for infringing material. Now, sophisticated fingerprinting 
technology has made identifying and removing infringing material not only 
possible, but fairly easy for ISPs.64 Why, then, should ISPs continue to get a 
free ride? Moreover, OCILLA created problems where none existed before. 
In its effort to provide some limited speech protections through a take-down 
and put-back process, it created a system that in practice has largely been 
speech-limiting.65 Such unintended consequences are difficult to undo and the 
law more generally has become antiquated in the face of new technology.  
As new challenges arise in e-sports and in the context of other emerging 
technology-based industries, legislatures should take serious pause before 
adopting new laws. Courts should take the lead in this arena and should 
consider how longstanding, undergirding principles shed light on a path 
forward. There will be instances in which new legislation is required, but it 
should be the path of last resort. When necessary, legislation should be 
undertaken only once some degree of technological stabilization has been 
reached; the statutes must then be written, as much as possible, with broad 
principles—rather than industry-specific considerations—in mind. 
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